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# THE EFFECT OF AUDIT COMMITTEES, CAPITAL INTENSITY, AND GENDER DIVERSITY ON TAX AVOIDANCE

# Lia Amliah<sup>1</sup>, Juniati Gunawan<sup>2</sup>

<sup>12</sup>Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis, Universitas Trisakti liaamliah7@gmail.com¹, juniatigunawan@trisakti.ac.id ²

Kyai Tapa No. 1 Grogol

Corresponding email: liaamliah7@gmail.com

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# **ABSTRACT**

This study aims to analyze the effects of audit committees—measured by audit committee size and expertise—capital intensity, and gender diversity on tax avoidance, with company size as a control variable. A total of 140 samples were selected using purposive sampling. The secondary data were obtained from the annual and financial reports of infrastructure, property, and real estate sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2019 to 2023. Multiple linear regression was employed as the quantitative analysis tool. The results indicate that audit committee size and expertise have a negative effect on tax avoidance, meaning that larger audit committees and those with higher expertise are associated with lower levels of corporate tax avoidance. In contrast, capital intensity and gender diversity have no significant effect on tax avoidance. These findings underscore the importance of the audit committee's role as a corporate governance mechanism in curbing tax avoidance practices.

## **INTRODUCTION**

The government can use taxes to promote economic growth and development. Tax revenues support the expansion of specific sectors and the establishment of new industries. Many developing countries face challenges in financing various essential projects due to unstable sources of income (Malik et al., 2025). Based on data from the Directorate General of Taxes, the following are the tax revenue targets and actual collections

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for the last five years, from 2019 to 2023.

Table 1.1 Realization of Tax Revenue

Year	Tax revenue target	Realization of Tax	Remarks
		Revenue	
2019	Rp1.1780,9 trillion	Rp1.577,56 trillion	84,4 % of the target
2020	Rp1.198,8 trillion	Rp.1.070,0 trillion	83,9 % of the target
2021	Rp1.229,6 trillion	Rp1.231,87 trillion	100,19 % of the target
2022	Rp1.485,1 trillion	Rp1.716,8 trillion	115,6 % of the target
2023	Rp1.818,3 trillion	Rp1.869,23 trillion	102,80 % of the target

Source: pajak.go.id

The changes in tax revenue targets and realizations from 2019 to 2023 were influenced by various economic factors, fiscal policies, and both global and domestic conditions. In 2019 and 2020, tax revenue realizations fell short of the targets. In 2019, the achievement rate was 84.4%. The decline in tax revenue was primarily due to a slowdown in the global and domestic economies. The main factor in 2020 was the COVID-19 pandemic, which severely impacted economic activity. Many business sectors experienced reduced income or even closures, directly affecting tax revenue realization. However, starting in 2021 and continuing through 2022 and 2023, there was an improvement, with realizations exceeding 100% of the targets. This achievement indicates a gradual economic recovery following the pandemic.

Corporate income tax is a significant financial burden for companies, which can reduce the after-tax income received by company shareholders. With the aim of reducing tax costs, companies use strategies permitted by regulations to improve their tax efficiency and lower the effective tax rate (Malik & Munir, 2025). Tax avoidance practices by corporations are a crucial aspect of corporate financial decision-making. From a corporate perspective, tax obligations are a significant burden in business management, which in turn encourages corporations to engage in tax avoidance as a strategy to reduce financial pressure. (Xie & Huang, 2023).

The tax avoidance case in Indonesia involved PT BAPI as the suspect corporation that was deemed to have deliberately submitted an incorrect or incomplete Income Tax Return (SPT) for Income Tax Article 4 Paragraph (2) for the period from August to December 2018, as well as failing to submit the SPT for Income Tax Article 4 Paragraph (2) for the period from January to December 2019 to the Tangerang Timur Tax Office (KPP) consecutively and continuously. The actions taken by the defendant during the period from August 2018 to December 2019 have caused the state to suffer a loss in tax revenue of at least Rp2,907,426,172. As a result, PT BAPI was designated as a corporate defendant because the actions were carried out within the context of a business relationship or other arrangement, whether individually or collectively, acting on behalf of and for the benefit of the corporation.

Several factors may affect tax avoidance, with the first factor in this research is the audit committee (Hilmi et al., 2022). Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between company management, the board of commissioners, shareholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance provides a framework and system through which companies are directed and their objectives are set, as well as determining how to achieve



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those objectives and monitoring their performance (OECD, 2023). In this research, the audit committee is measured by the size of the audit committee and the accounting expertise of the audit committee. The audit committee is formed by the board of commissioners to supervise and ensure that internal audit operations support the company in achieving its objectives by using a structured and objective approach to evaluate and improve the efficiency of risk management, internal control, and corporate governance (KNKG, 2021).

The second factor that can influence tax avoidance is capital intensity (Firdaus & Poerwati, 2022). Capital intensity is the amount of funds invested by a company in fixed assets to finance its operations. When asset depreciation costs increase, the taxes paid by the company will decrease. Capital intensity is linked to tax avoidance, which reveals that a company's fixed assets provide the company with the opportunity to reduce their tax burden as a result of the depreciation arising from fixed assets each year (Hendayana et al., 2024).

The latest factor affecting tax avoidance is gender diversity. (Iksani & Hutagaol, 2023). Diversity within the scope provides a wide range of perspectives, which enhances effective decision-making. This diversity relates to characteristics that are issues of scope and level, including type of education and expertise, and gender (Cumming & Leung, 2021). In this research, gender diversity is related to the representation of women on the board of directors. The presence of women on the board of directors can help improve corporate management. The board of directors is responsible for ensuring the integrity of the accounting system and providing timely and accurate access to all financial information (KNKG, 2021).

Both large and small companies will be more cautious when deciding on tax payments because failure to do so will cause losses for the company. In addition, companies do not want to take the risk of being audited or penalized, which will make the company appear in a badway (Permata et al., 2018).

Based on the previous background and literature review, this research is titled "The Effect of Audit Committees, Capital Intensity, and Gender Diversity on Tax Avoidance." The research was expanded by including the variables of audit committees and capital intensity Muljadi et al. (2022) and Marlinda et al. (2020), gender diversity variable Shinta & Putra (2025); Tanujaya & Anggreany (2021); Iksani & Hutagaol (2023). The difference between this research and previous researchers is that it uses audit committee quality measured by audit committee size and audit committee expertise (Dang & Nguyen, 2022). In addition, this research utilizes company data from the infrastructure, property, and real estate sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period 2019-2023 because companies in the infrastructure, property, and real estate sectors tend to have large fixed assets, which are very important for their operations (Rahman et al., 2021).

# LITERATURE REVIEW

## **Agency Theory**

The agency theory is used to understand the relationship between individuals or groups of people (principals) who use the diensten of others (agents) to carry out



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activities on behalf of the principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The principal delegates decision-making authority to the agent. This is commonly known as an agency relationship. (Rankin et al., 2018). Principal and agent are utility maximizers, so there is a strong argument for believing that agents may not always behave in a manner that is in the best interests of the principal. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Within the framework of agency theory, tax avoidance practices are viewed as actions taken by an entity to withhold cash that should be paid to tax authorities. These withheld funds have the potential to increase the company's value and, consequently, shareholder value. However, the relationship between tax avoidance and enhanced shareholder value can be complicated by agency problems stemming from the separation of interests between shareholders and management (Wang et al., 2019).

# Stakeholder theory

Stakeholder theory (Hill & Jones, 1992) has sought to shift agency literature beyond the shareholder primacy perspective, which focuses solely on aligning the interests of CEOs and shareholders. The assumptions of agency opportunism and self-interest remain, but stakeholder theory examines the differences in interests between CEOs and corporate stakeholders, defined as "any group that can influence or be influenced by the achievement of organizational goals" (Freeman, 1984). The stakeholder theory argues that organizations have a responsibility to consider the concerns and interests of internal and external stakeholders, which include employees, customers, investors, suppliers, and local communities (Ashrafi et al., 2020).

The stakeholder theory approach to tax avoidance argues that shareholders are affected by tax avoidance both as owners of the company and as members of society. However, as owners of the company, shareholders are usually more focused on the direct benefits gained from tax avoidance, such as an increase in the company's cash flow, which can later be distributed as dividends. On a different note, tax avoidance also has indirect effects on them as members of society, such as a decline in the quality of public services and infrastructure. These effects are usually not immediately apparent, are more widespread, and emerge over the long term (Belz et al., 2016).

### **Audit committee**

The audit committee has been established by the board of commissioners to monitor and ensure that internal audit operations help the corporation accomplish its goals through a disciplined and objective approach to evaluating and improving the efficiency of risk management, internal control, and corporate governance (KNKG, 2021). The agency theory presented by Jensen & Meckling (1976) emphasizes the role of audit committees in reducing agency conflicts by promoting accountability between management and shareholders. In the context of this study, agency theory highlights the importance of audit committee characteristics, such as size and expertise, in reducing potential conflicts between shareholders.

The board of commissioners ensures that all members of the audit committee are independent and that other committees established by the board of commissioners have a majority of independent members, and furthermore that all committee members have the appropriate competence, commitment, and authority to perform their duties



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effectively and independently. (KNKG, 2021).

## Size of the audit committee

The role of the audit committee in overseeing the financial reporting process and reducing opportunistic managerial behavior stems from the problems of information asymmetry and agency problems inherent in the separation between ownership and managerial control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The audit committee may enhance internal control systems and be considered a useful oversight instrument for enhancing the quality of information disclosure (KNKG, 2021). The size of the audit committee is considered to be a key determinant of its effectiveness. Larger audit committees are considered to provide better oversight by bringing a wider range of perspectives and experience to bear (Rouf & Akhtaruddin, 2019). Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK) Regulation No. 55/POJK.04/2015 stipulates that the audit committee must consist of at least three members, one of whom is an independent commissioner, while the other two members must also be independent external parties.

# **Expertise of the audit committee**

The audit committee must consist of at least one member with a background in finance or accounting, in accordance with Financial Services Authority (OJK) Regulation No. 55/POJK.04/2015. Audit committee members who are auditors, accountants, or financial staff involved in financial reporting are more likely to have experience in assessing the quantitative and qualitative aspects of materiality related to control weaknesses, and are more likely to be familiar with regulatory guidelines and standard setting regarding materiality (Lisic et al., 2019). This knowledge can be demonstrated by current or previous work experience related to accounting, finance, or membership in relevant (professional) institutions (Karim et al., 2024).

## **Capital Intensity**

The capital intensity is the amount of funds invested by a company in fixed assets to finance its operations. (Hendayana et al., 2024). Capital intensity is the amount of capital investment needed to make a certain number of products. (Arora et al., 2020). In accordance with Article 6 of Income Tax Regulation No. 36 of 2008, expenses that can reduce profits can be considered deductible expenses, specifically depreciation and amortization. In agency theory, it is stated that unused cash can be invested in fixed assets to reduce depreciation costs from the company's total tax liability. Company management can utilize the depreciation costs generated from fixed assets to reduce the tax burden imposed on the company (Hendrianto et al., 2022).

## **Gender diversity**

Diversity within the scope provides a broader perspective from diverse points of view, which improves effective decision-making. This diversity relates to characteristics that are issues of scope and level, including type of education and expertise, and gender (Cumming & Leung, 2021). In this research, gender diversity is related to the representation of women on the board of directors. The board of directors is responsible for ensuring the integrity of the accounting system and providing timely and accurate



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access to all financial information. The composition of the board of directors is structured in such a way that each member reflects the various skills, knowledge, experience, age, cultural background, and gender diversity necessary to perform their responsibilities effectively (KNKG, 2021). Based on agency theory, women on the board of directors can provide a different perspective and prevent undesirable decision-making mistakes (Pasaribu & Kawedar, 2024).

## Tax avoidance


Tax avoidance is a legal method used by individuals, businesses, and organizations to minimize their tax obligations. (Lucut Capras et al., 2024). By taking advantage of tax loopholes, exemptions, deductions, and other provisions in tax laws, individuals and entities can legally reduce the amount of tax they have to pay. This allows them to retain more of their income and assets without breaking any laws (Delgado et al., 2023).

Whenever companies engage in tax avoidance practices, the effective tax rate (ETR) can serve as a primary metric for measuring the extent to which they deviate from the tax rates set by government authorities. The difference between financial accounting and taxable income, as revealed in the ETR, is an empirical indicator of the tax avoidance practices employed by companies (Nebie & Cheng, 2023).

## Firm size

The size of a company is categorized into groups based on how large or small it is in order to illustrate its operational activities and income. Larger companies tend to require more funds than smaller companies, due to the fact that larger companies tend to generate greater income (Mahdiana & Amin, 2020). Both large and small companies will be more cautious when deciding on tax payments because failure to do so will cause losses for the company. In addition, companies do not want to take the risk of being audited or penalized, which will make the company appear in a badway (Permata et al., 2018).

## **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**





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#### **HYPOTHESIS**

## The effect size of audit committees on tax avoidance

The size of audit committees is considered to be a key determinant of their effectiveness. Larger audit committees are considered to provide better oversight by bringing a wider range of perspectives and experiences (Rouf & Akhtaruddin, 2019). Research conducted by Puspita & Wulandari (2023) and Hilmi et al., (2022) indicates that the size of the audit committee has a negative effect on tax avoidance. The more audit committees there are in a company, the higher the level of corporate governance that will be achieved, which will ultimately reduce the likelihood of tax avoidance practices.

H1: The size of the audit committee has a negative effect on tax avoidance.

# The effect of the audit committee's expertise on tax avoidance

The effect of the audit committee's expertise on tax avoidance. The agency theory suggests that audit committee members with a background and expertise in accounting and finance are better able to identify management's efforts to reduce tax burdens, thereby reducing conflicts of interest caused by management's desire to engage in fraudulent activities (Lisic et al., 2019). Research conducted by Ziliwu et al., (2021) and Mauren & Purwaningsih (2022) found that audit committee expertise has a negative effect on tax avoidance. Therefore, the hypothesis formulated in this research is: H2: Audit committee expertise has a negative effect on tax avoidance.

Hz. Addit committee expertise has a negative effect on tax avoids

## The effect of capital intensity on tax avoidance

Capital intensity is the amount of funds a company invests in fixed assets to fund its operations. A high level of fixed asset ownership implies high depreciation costs. High depreciation costs can reduce a company's tax burden. Therefore, the higher a company's fixed asset ownership, the more it is incentivized to engage in aggressive tax avoidance strategies (Hendayana et al., 2024). Research conducted by Firdaus & Poerwati (2022), Damayanti & Sitorus (2024), and Cahyamustika & Oktaviani (2024) indicates that capital intensity has a positive effect on tax avoidance. Therefore, the hypothesis formulated in this research is:

H3: Capital intensity has a positive effect on tax avoidance.

## The effect of gender diversity on tax avoidance

The research conducted by Arisandi et al. (2024) shows that gender diversity has a negative effect on tax avoidance, due to differences in characteristics between female and male directors, where women tend to be more compliant with rules and risk-averse compared to men who tend to be less compliant with regulations and more risk-taking in decision-making. With the presence of women, it is expected that tax avoidance actions will be minimized quickly. This statement is supported by Tanujaya & Anggreany (2021) and Iksani & Hutagaol (2023) who state that gender diversity has a negative effect on tax avoidance. Therefore, the hypothesis formulated in this research is:

H4: Gender diversity has a negative effect on tax avoidance.



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#### RESEARCH METHOD

# The research design

The design of this research is based on quantitative research, which will rely on data collection, factor analysis, and identification of relationships between variables. The basis of this research is hypothesis testing. This study aims to examine how audit committees (audit committee size and audit committee expertise), capital intensity, and gender diversity impact the dependent variable of tax avoidance, with company size as a control variable.

This research uses data from annual reports and sustainability reports of companies in the infrastructure, property, and real estate sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2019 to 2023. Purposive sampling was used in selecting the sample because it limits the sample based on predetermined criteria.

This research uses unbalanced panel data, which is characterized by an unequal number of time series observations based on cross-sectional units. Panel data includes continuous and discrete time series and cross-sectional data.

Table 3. 1 Operational variables and measurement

Tax avoidance
Tax expense
$ETR = \frac{\text{Tax expense}}{\text{Earnings before tax}}$
Size of the Audit Committee
$KOMA = \Sigma$ Audit Committee
<b>Expertise of the Audit Committee</b>
$ACEXP = \frac{\text{Audit committee members with accounting and financial expertise}}{Model of the problem of the p$
Total audit committee members
Capital intensity
$CIR = \frac{\text{Fixed assets}}{\text{Fixed assets}}$
$CIR = \frac{CIR}{\text{Total assets}}$
Gender diversity
Total Female Directors
$DIVBOD = {\text{Total Board of Directors}}$
Firm Size
Ln = Total Assets

## RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

# **Data description**

The objects used in this research are companies in the infrastructure, property, and real estate sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. This research was conducted from 2019 to 2023. Sample selection was based on criteria using the purposive sampling method.



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**Table 4. 1 Data description** 

Description	Amount
Infrastructure, property, and real estate companies	43
Companies that did not use the rupiah in their financial	(0)
reports during the 2019-2023 period	
Companies that did not have positive earnings before tax	(0)
during the 2019-2023	
Total companies used	43
Research period 2019-2023	5
Total research sample	215

# **Descriptive Statistics**

**Table 4. 2 Descriptive Statistics** 

	Size of the	Expertise	Capital	Gender	Tax	Firm Size
	Audit	of the	intensity	diversity	avoidance	
	Committee	Audit				
		Committee				
Mean	3,13	0,66	0,22	0,12	0,14	25,32
Maximum	7	1	0.90	0,75	1,60	31,83
Minimum	2	0,25	0	0,00	0,00	12,31
Std. Dev	0,59	0,22	0,27	0,17	0,19	5,01
Observation	215	215	215	215	215	215

Source: Processed Data (SPSS 26.0)

#### a. Size of the Audit Committee

The Audit Committee Size variable has an average of 3.13, with a maximum of 7 members at PT Telkom Indonesia Tbk in 2020 and a minimum of 2 members at PT Roda Vivatex Tbk, and a standard deviation of 0.59. This value indicates that most of the sample companies have met the requirements of POJK No. 55/POJK.04/2015, which mandates that every public company have an audit committee with a minimum of three members, including one independent commissioner. These findings align with the role of the audit committee as an effective oversight body in accordance with the principles of Good Corporate Governance.

## b. Expertise of the Audit Committee

The Audit Committee Expertise variable has an average of 0.66, which means that around 66% of audit committee members have a background in accounting or finance. The maximum value of 1 is found at PT Cikarang Listrindo Tbk, where all audit committee members have expertise in that field, while the minimum value of 0.25 indicates that there are companies with only 25% of members meeting the required expertise, such as PT PP Presisi Tbk. These results



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align with POJK No. 55/POJK.04/2015, which requires that at least one audit committee member has an accounting or financial background.

# c. Capital intensity

The capital intensity variable is measured by the ratio of total fixed assets to total company assets. Descriptive analysis shows that the average capital intensity is 0.22, indicating that, in general, companies allocate around 22% of their assets to investment in fixed assets. The maximum value of 0.90 at PT Bali Towerindo Sentra Tbk indicates that the company has a very high capital intensity and is highly dependent on fixed assets, while the minimum value of 0.00 indicates the existence of a company that is not dependent on fixed assets.

## d. Gender diversity

The measurement of gender diversity using the ratio of female directors to the total number of directors resulted in an average value of 0.12, with a maximum value of 0.75 and a minimum value of 0.00. The standard deviation of 0.17 indicates a fairly large spread of data between companies. This average value of 0.12 indicates that, in general, the proportion of female directors in the sample companies remains low, at around 12%. The maximum value of 0.75 at PT Suryamas Dutamakmur Tbk in 2022 and 2023 has 3 female directors out of a total of 4 directors, while the minimum value of 0.00 means that there are companies that do not have any female directors at all, such as PT Jaya Real Property Tbk.

## e. Tax avoidance

The tax avoidance variable is measured using the effective tax rate (ETR), which is the tax burden divided by pre-tax profit. Descriptive statistics show an average ETR of 0.14 or 14%, which is lower than the normal tax rate in Indonesia, indicating the possibility of tax avoidance practices. The maximum ETR value was 1.60 for PT Intiland Development Tbk in 2021 with high tax payments, while the minimum value of 0.00 indicates that there are companies that do not pay taxes at all despite having profits, due to several reasons, such as the use of tax facilities and previous fiscal losses. The standard deviation of 0.19 shows that the variation in ETR between companies is relatively low.

## f. Firm Size

The firm size variable has an average of 25.32, a maximum value of 31.83, a minimum value of 12.31, and a standard deviation of 5.01. Firm size is calculated using the natural log of total assets, with data obtained from annual reports. The wide variation in company size indicates that the research sample includes both large and small companies, which may affect the level of tax avoidance.

# Classic assumption test Normality Test

In the initial sample consisting of 215 data points, it was found that the data was not normally distributed. Therefore, outliers were identified and removed, leaving 140 valid data points. In this case, normality testing can be seen from the distribution of data on the Normal P-P Plot graph and the One Sample Kolmogorov Smirnov Test. The results of the normality test can be seen from the distribution of data on the Normal P-P Plot graph as follows:

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


Figure 4. 1 Normal P-P Plot

Based on graph 4.1 above, the data processing results show that in this research, the distribution is not normal, where the data is not spread around the diagonal line and does not follow the direction of the diagonal line or is scattered far from the diagonal line. Thus, it can be said that the normality requirements in this study cannot be met and are not suitable for use in research. Therefore, the data must be outliers. Outliers in this research use the Box Plot method. The following are the outlier results:




Figure 4. 2 Normal P-P Plot

Based on graph 4.2 above, the data processing results show that this study is normally distributed, where the data is spread around the diagonal line and follows the direction of the diagonal line or is not scattered far from the diagonal line. Thus, it can be said that the normality requirements in this study can be met and are suitable for use in research.

Table 4. 3 One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test						
	Unstandardized Residual					
N		215				
Normal Parameters	Mean	0,000				
	Std. deviation	0,187				
Most Extreme	Absolute	0,160				
Differences	Positive	0,134				
	Negative	-0,160				
Test Statistics		0,160				
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		0,000				

Source: Processed Data (SPSS 26.0)



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Based on the output in Table 4.4, it can be seen that the Sig. (2-tailed) value is less than 0.05, which was 0.000. So, we can say that the data in this research is not normally distributed. Therefore, the data must be checked for outliers. Here are the results of the outlier check for the data above:

Table 4. 4 One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test						
	Unstandardized Residual					
N		140				
Normal Parameters	Mean	0,000				
	Std. deviation	0,105				
Most Extreme	Absolute	0,057				
Differences	Positive	0,057				
	Negative	-0,041				
Test Statistics		0,057				
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		0,200				

Source: Processed Data (SPSS 26.0)

Based on the table above, it can be seen that the Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) value is 0.200. This indicates that 0.200 > 0.05, so it can be concluded that the data is normally distributed.

## **Multicollinearity Test**

**Table 4. 5Multicollinearity Test** 

Model		Collinearity Statistics	
1		Tolerance	VIF
	(Constant)		
	Size of the Audit Committee	0,713	1,403
	Expertise of the Audit	0,847	1,180
	Committee		
	Capital intensity	0,914	1,095
	Gender diversity	0,988	1,012
	Firm Size	0,667	1,499

Source: Processed Data (SPSS 26.0)

Based on the table above, all variables obtained tolerance values > 0.10 and VIF < 10.00, so it can be concluded that none of the variables above exhibit multicollinearity.



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#### **Autocorrelation Test**

**Table 4. 6 Autocorrelation Test** 

Model Sur	nmary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted	Std. Error	Durbin-
		_	R	of the	Watson
			Square	Estimate	
1	0,446	0,199	0,169	0,103	1,193

Source: Processed Data (SPSS 26.0)

#### Known:

d = 1.193dU = 1.7830

4-dU = 4 - 1.7830 = 2.217

Based on the table above, it shows that dU < d < 4-dU or 1.193 < 1.7830 < 2.217, so the zero hypothesis is accepted, meaning that there is no autocorrelation.

# **Heteroscedasticity Test**

**Table 4. 7 Heteroscedasticity Test** 

			SA	EA	CI	GD	FS	Unstandar
								dized
								Residu
								al
Spear	SA	Sig. (2-		0,045	0,121	0,053	0,005	0,938
ma		tailed)						
n's	EA	Sig. (2-	0,045		0,570	0,578	0,001	0,910
rho		tailed)						
	CI	Sig. (2-	0,121	0,570		0,064	0,007	0,248
		tailed)						
	GD	Sig. (2-	0,053	0,578	0,064		0,118	0,508
		tailed)						
	FS	Sig. (2-	0,005	0,001	0,007	0,118		0,434
		tailed)						

Source: Processed Data (SPSS 26.0)

Based on the table above, there is no indication of heteroscedasticity, as the significance level obtained is greater than 0.05.

# **Hypothesis Test**

## **Coefficient of Determination Test**

A value of R Square of 0.199 indicates that the contribution of the audit committee (size of the audit committee and expertise of the audit committee), capital intensity, and gender diversity to tax avoidance is 19.9%. The remaining 80.1% is explained by other variables outside the scope of this research.



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**Table 4. 8 Coefficient of Determination Test** 

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted	Std. Error
			R	of the
			Square	Estimate
1	0,446	0,199	0,169	0,103

Source: Processed Data (SPSS 26.0)

## **F-Statistic Test**

**Table 4. 9 F-Statistic Test** 

F	Sig.
6,672	0,000

Source: Processed Data (SPSS 26.0

Based on the F test results, it is known that the calculate F value of 6.672 > the table F value of 2.44 and the significance value of 0.000 < 0.05. This means that there is at least one independent variable, which is the size of the audit committee, the expertise of the audit committee, capital intensity, and gender diversity, that has a significant effect on tax avoidance.

#### t-Statistic Test

Table 4. 10 t-Statistic Test

Variabel	Unstandardized B	Т	Sig.	Keputusan
(Constant)	0,618	6,094	0,000	
SA	-0,044	-2,794	0,006	H1 diterima
EA	-0,104	-3,108	0,002	H2 diterima
CI	0,043	1,267	0,207	H3 ditolak
GD	-0,080	-1,740	0,084	H4 ditolak
FS	-0,009	-4,507	0,000	

Source: Processed Data (SPSS 26.0)

## H1: The size of the audit committee has a negative effect on tax avoidance.

The significance value of the interaction variable between the size of the audit committee and tax avoidance is 0.006 < 0.05, so the conclusion is that H1 or the first hypothesis is accepted.

# H2: The expertise of the audit committee has a negative effect on tax avoidance.

The significance level of the interaction variable between audit committee expertise and tax avoidance is 0.002 < 0.05, so the conclusion is that H2 or the second hypothesis is accepted

# H3: Capital intensity has a positive effect on tax avoidance.

The significance level of the interaction variable between capital intensity and tax avoidance is 0.207 > 0.05, so the conclusion is that H3 or the third hypothesis is rejected.

H4: Gender diversity has a negative effect on tax avoidance.



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The significance value of the interaction variable between gender diversity and tax avoidance is 0.084 > 0.05, so the conclusion is that H4 or the fourth hypothesis is rejected.

# **Results of Regression Equations**

$$PP = 0.618 - 0.044 \, SA - 0.104 \, EA + 0.043 \, CI - 0.080 \, GD - 0.009 \, FS + \epsilon$$

## Discussion of research results

## a. The size of the audit committee on tax avoidance

Based on the results of this research, it shows that the size of the audit committee has a negative and significant effect on tax avoidance. The implementation of corporate governance in the infrastructure, property, and real estate sectors is also in line with a number of provisions regulated by the Financial Services Authority (OJK). For example, POJK No. 55/POJK.04/2015 encourages the formation of an effective audit committee to assist the board of commissioners in supervising financial reporting and regulatory compliance. The provisions of POJK No. 55/POJK.04/2015 encourage the formation of an effective audit committee to assist the board of commissioners in supervising financial reporting and regulatory compliance. For example, POJK No. 55/POJK.04/2015 encourages the formation of an effective audit committee to assist the board of commissioners in supervising financial reporting and compliance with regulations. This provision has been adopted by property companies to improve the effectiveness of corporate management. Based on statistical testing, the average size of the audit committee is 3.13. The average value of 3.13 indicates that most of the sample companies have met the provisions of POJK No. 55/POJK.04/2015, which requires every public company to have an audit committee with a minimum of three members, including one independent commissioner.

The more audit committees there are in a company, the more oversight there is of its activities, according to agency theory. Plus, agency conflicts caused by management wanting to avoid taxes can be minimized. The negative impact of audit committee size is supported by Puspita & Wulandari (2023) and Hilmi et al., (2022) who demonstrate that audit committee size has a negative effect on tax avoidance. The more audit committees there are in a company, the higher the level of corporate governance, which ultimately reduces the likelihood of tax avoidance practices. The audit committee will always oversee everything within the company; companies with an audit committee will be more transparent and accountable in presenting their financial reports.

# b. Audit committee's expertise on tax avoidance

Based on the results of this research, it shows that the audit committee's expertise has a negative and significant effect on tax avoidance. The audit committee must consist of at least one member who has a financial or accounting educational background, in accordance with Financial Services Authority (OJK) Regulation Number 55/POJK.04/2015. The Audit Committee Expertise variable



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has an average of 0.66, meaning that approximately 66% of audit committee members in the infrastructure, property, and real estate sectors have a background in accounting or finance. The audit committee's experience in finance and accounting is crucial for audit outcomes. Companies with audit committees that have experience in fundamental accounting analysis, finance, and taxation are better at curbing tax avoidance practices. The negative impact of the size of the audit committee is supported by Mauren & Purwaningsih (2022) who state that with a knowledgeable audit committee, corporate tax avoidance rarely occurs. When the audit committee lacks accounting or financial expertise, companies violate tax regulations to avoid excessive taxes.

## c. Capital intensity on tax avoidance

Based on the results of this research, it shows that capital intensity has no effect on tax avoidance. Therefore, it can be concluded that the third hypothesis is rejected. This result is inconsistent with the research conducted by Firdaus & Poerwati (2022), Damayanti & Sitorus (2024), and Cahyamustika & Oktaviani (2024) who stated that capital intensity has a positive effect on tax avoidance. The t-test results indicate that capital intensity does not have a sufficiently strong influence in encouraging companies to engage in tax avoidance. One possible reason for this is that the companies in the sample have good corporate governance and are subject to stricter and more comprehensive supervision (as evidenced in H1 and H2), so that the depreciation burden on fixed assets reflected in capital intensity is not large enough to significantly reduce taxable income and does not encourage tax avoidance behavior.

The results of this research are in line with the conclusions drawn by Indaryanti & As'ari (2023) which indicate that capital intensity does not affect tax avoidance. Companies with high fixed assets utilize them to support their operational activities, not intentionally increase their investment in fixed assets to avoid taxes. A high proportion of fixed assets will not affect the level of tax avoidance that a company will undertake (Lestari & Dewi, 2024).

# d. Gender diversity on tax avoidance

Based on the results of this research, it shows that gender diversity has no effect on tax avoidance. Agency theory does not apply in this case because the data shows that there is no relationship between tax avoidance and gender diversity on the board of directors (Berliana & Herawaty, 2024).

In agency theory, the presence of women on the board increases board independence, leading to a reduction in agency problems. In addition, as a consequence, it increases the transparency of information regarding ETR, focusing more on profitability, which is an important figure for shareholders. Therefore, women are considered to be highly professional and knowledgeable, thereby helping to reduce agency costs and increase commitment to tax regulations (Shinta & Putra, 2025).

The results of this research are in line with research conducted by Berliana & Herawaty (2024), which states that gender diversity has no effect on tax avoidance. The board of directors is responsible for supervising executive management, ensuring compliance with laws and regulations, and considering the



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long-term interests of shareholders. The percentage of women on the board of directors does not affect the occurrence of tax avoidance practices.

## **CONCLUSION**

This study was conducted to examine the influence of audit committees (specifically, the size and expertise of audit committees), capital intensity, and gender diversity, with business strategy serving as a moderating variable. The research sample comprised 140 companies from the infrastructure, property, and real estate sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2019 and 2023. Data analysis was performed using panel data regression with SPSS version 26. The findings indicate that both the size and expertise of audit committees have a negative effect on tax avoidance, while capital intensity and gender diversity do not significantly impact tax avoidance. It is recommended that future research expand the scope to include companies from sectors beyond infrastructure, property, and real estate, and extend the study period.

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