

## THE ROLE OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE IN MODERATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEVERAGE, COMPANY SIZE, AND INVENTORY INTENSITY ON TAX AGGRESSIVENESS

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### ABSTRACT

*Tax aggressiveness is an important issue in corporate governance because it has an impact on state revenue and corporate sustainability. Amid the government's efforts to optimize taxes, this practice needs to be reviewed to understand the factors that influence it. This research investigates how leverage, company size, and inventory intensity influence tax aggressiveness, while also exploring the moderating role from the audit committee in non-cyclical consumer firms listed on the IDX during 2021–2023. Employing a quantitative approach, the study utilizes secondary data obtained from company financial statements. The evaluation involves conducted using panel data regression and Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA), processed with EViews version 12. The study encompasses a population of all listed non-cyclicals consumer sector firms, from which analyzed 53 firms was drawn using purposive sampling. Findings indicate that leverage negatively and significantly affects aggressive tax behaviour, whereas company size significantly increases tax aggressiveness. Conversely, inventory intensity does not appear to significantly impact tax aggressiveness. Furthermore, the audit committee effectively moderates the relationships between leverage and company size with tax aggressiveness, but does not moderate the impact of inventory intensity on tax aggressiveness.*

### INTRODUCTION

Taxes are an obligation that must be fulfilled by every member of society as a form

of contribution to the state, which is utilized for the interests of the government and the broader welfare of the community. Taxes received by the state will be used to build the government, including developing infrastructure for the prosperity and well-being of the people. However, fulfilling tax obligations often faces challenges, one of which is the phenomenon of tax aggressiveness undertaken by companies. Tax aggressiveness is a tax planning strategy aimed at significantly reducing tax liabilities. This condition creates a gap between the government's targeted tax revenue and the actual realization in the field, primarily due to companies exploiting loopholes in tax regulations. Meanwhile, the government remains dedicated to enhancing tax revenue as a means of funding national development. This phenomenon is increasingly relevant amidst efforts to enhance tax compliance and strengthen corporate governance.

The current economic conditions enable companies to expand their businesses to achieve maximum profit. To reach this target, companies implement tax planning strategies to reduce costs that could decrease their revenue, namely through tax aggressiveness. Companies view taxes as a burden and strive to minimize the taxes paid. According to Lietz (2013), tax aggressiveness is one aspect of tax avoidance, and its legality ranges from unclear to impermissible. Tax avoidance actions are permissible if the company undertakes these actions based on applicable laws.

The primary focus of this research is tax aggressiveness, which may depend on variables like leverage, company size, together with inventory levels. A company with high leverage is more likely to have significant interest expenses, which can reduce the amount of taxable income. This encourages companies to aggressively use debt as a tax shield. On the other hand, large companies have more adequate resources to design complex tax strategies, while also facing greater regulatory scrutiny. Meanwhile, high inventory intensity reflects a significant amount of funds invested in inventory, which can potentially affect the tax burden through inventory cost management.

Previous research has yielded mixed results regarding the impact regarding the roles of leverage, firm size, and inventory intensity in tax aggressiveness. Prior research by (Suhendar et al., 2024), identified a positive impact impact of leverage on tax avoidance behavior, while studies by (Anggraeni et al., 2023; Dewi, 2020; Herlinda & Rahmawati, 2021; Hidayati et al., 2021) observed a negative impact relationship between leverage and tax planning aggressiveness. Similarly, company size and inventory intensity have shown inconsistent results across various studies.

To bridge the inconsistency in the findings of previous research, this study introduces audit committee acting as a moderator. Audit oversight board plays a role in overseeing a company's tax practices, ensuring regulatory compliance, and maintaining the integrity of financial statements. With a more focused oversight function, the audit committee has the potential to limit aggressive behavior in tax planning that could harm the company and its stakeholders. In this study, the researcher takes the initiative to assess the influence of leverage, company size, and inventory intensity on tax aggressiveness and evaluate the audit committee's moderating role moderating these relationships in consumer non-cyclicals companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) from 2021-2023.

## LITERATUR REVIEW

### Agency Theory

Agency theory introduced by Jensen & Meckling (1976), posits a contractual relationship between managers (agents) and owners (principals), where their interests can be conflicting. Managers, possessing more information, are inclined to engage in opportunistic behaviors such as tax aggressiveness for personal gain or to create a positive corporate image, which ultimately risks harming the principals. Managers tend to minimize tax burdens to maximize company profits. With seemingly high profits, managers hope to enhance their performance image in the eyes of owners and other stakeholders.

### Tax Aggressiveness

Aggressive corporate tax practices aims to minimize the fiscal liability to avoid the desired tax imposition (Zain, 2008). In other words, tax aggressiveness is carried out to reduce tax expenses in order to save company revenue. Most companies view taxes an obligation that may diminish profit margins, which leads management be inclined to look for loopholes in tax regulations to legally or illegally lower the tax obligations. This action is in the form of the agency and principal conflict of interest, where managers strive to improve company performance by minimizing tax expenses so that profits appear higher.

### Leverage

Leverage is a way to assess the magnitude of fixed costs that a company applies in its operations (Brigham & Houston, 2019). By utilizing leverage, companies hope to increase shareholder profits because funds from debt can be used for investments that generate a higher return than the cost of the debt itself. High leverage also has the potential to encourage companies adopt more aggressive tax handling approaches due to interest expense being tax deductible, thereby reducing taxable income. In line with agency theory, high leverage will increase pressure and oversight from creditors on management, which ultimately limits the manager's room for maneuver in carrying out opportunistic actions such as tax aggressiveness. However, in some conditions, management utilizes leverage as a tool to formulate aggressive tax strategies to increase reported net profit. Previous research (Amalia, 2021; Anggraeni et al., 2023; Mustika & Nursiam, 2024; Suhendar et al., 2024) shows that leverage contributes positively to tax aggressiveness.

**H1: Leverage has a positive effect on tax aggressiveness**

### Company Size

Company size reflects the scale of operations and complexity of transactions, serving as an indicator of financial capacity and stability. Earlier studies by (Allo et al., 2021; Cahyaningtyas et al., 2024; Darma, 2020; Herlinda & Rahmawati, 2021; Romdhon et al., 2018) suggests that larger companies have better access to information, tax consultants, and technology, enabling them to structure tax planning more aggressively yet legally. This is consistent with the agency theory perspective, where large companies face pressure from shareholders to increase profits and company value, thus motivating management to pursue aggressive tax strategies to meet these expectations.

**H2: Company size has a positive effect on tax aggressiveness**

### **Inventory Intensity**

Inventory intensity indicates the level of a firm's capital allocation in inventory. The higher the inventory intensity, the greater the funds invested in inventory, which reflects the company's potential to influence tax expenses through inventory accounting and valuation methods. Prior research (Hulu & Hanah, 2024; Nadhifah, 2023; Saputra et al., 2023) details indicates that higher inventory intensity correlates with more tax aggressiveness. Companies with high inventory tend to be more proactive and strategic in managing tax burdens, including optimizing inventory recognition and valuation methods for fiscal efficiency. Based on agency theory, a high inventory value can be an opportunity for management to manipulate financial reports to obtain personal benefits, such as performance bonuses or a better financial image.

**H3: Inventory intensity has a positive effects on tax aggressiveness**

### **Audit Committee**

Designed for and reporting under the board's authority, the audit committee is obligated to perform oversight functions, such as ensuring tax compliance and accurate financial reporting. The number of audit committee members represents the effectiveness of quality of oversight regarding financial and tax practices. The the audit committee is anticipated to moderate the impact of leverage on aggressive tax behavior. When an entity has significant leverage, the oversight from the audit committee becomes crucial to ensure that tax avoidance strategies remain within legal boundaries and do not jeopardize the interests of shareholders. In principal-agent theory. the audit committee acts as a governance system which limits opportunistic actions by management and enhances financial transparency.


**H4: The audit committee can moderate the effect of leverage on tax aggressiveness**

Large companies have the incentives and mean to participate in aggressive fiscal strategy; however, with oversight from the audit committee, the strategies employed can be more controlled and compliant with existing regulations. Research by (Novia et al., 2024) details that the audit committee reinforces the linkage between company size and tax aggressiveness. This statement is relevant to the fundamental principle of agency theory, which posits that independent oversight can minimize information asymmetry between management and shareholders and reduce actions detrimental to the company's owners.

**H5: The audit committee can moderate the effect of company size on tax aggressiveness**

The high intensity of inventory also creates opportunities for management to manipulate financial reporting, including tax aggressiveness. The complexity of inventory recording and valuation can be exploited for personal gain. The audit committee, as an independent oversight mechanism, is expected to limit this opportunistic behavior and ensure tax management complies with regulations. Consistent with the assumptions of agency theory, the existence of an audit committee helps maintain a balance of interests between managers and capital owners, particularly in financial aspects that are susceptible to manipulation.

**H6: The audit committee can moderate the effect of inventory intensity on tax aggressiveness**



**Pict 1. Research Framework**

**RESEARCH METHOD**

Quantitative methodology was applied in this research, using secondary data from financial disclosures available on the authorized web portal IDX at [www.idx.co.id](http://www.idx.co.id). The population within this research consisted of all consumer non-cyclicals firms registered on the IDX during 2021 and 2023. samples are determined based on specific criteria detailed in the table below:

**Table 1. Sample Selection Criteria**

No.	Criteria	Total
1.	Consumer non-cyclicals sector companies listed on IDX 2021-2023	118
2.	Consumer non-cyclicals sector companies delisted on IDX 2021-2023	(26)
3.	Consumer non-cyclicals sector companies that do not publish financial statements on the official IDX website for the period 2021-2023	(5)
4.	Consumer non-cyclicals sector companies experiencing losses 2021-2023	(31)
5.	Consumer non-cyclicals sector companies that use foreign currencies in their financial reporting	(3)
<b>Total Sampel Company</b>		<b>53</b>
<b>Total Overall Sample (53 x 3 years)</b>		<b>159</b>

**Variabel Operationalization**

**Tax Aggressiveness**

This is represented through the Effective Tax Rate, consistent with the study by (Suhendar et al., 2024).

$$ETR = \frac{\text{Income Tax Expense}}{\text{Total Profit Before Tax}}$$

**Leverage**

This is proxied by the Debt to Asset Ratio, which explains the proportion of an entity's assets financed by debt

$$DAR = \frac{Total\ Debt}{Total\ Assets}$$

### Company size

Company size serves as a metric for categorizing businesses into large, medium, or small classifications.

$$Ln = Total\ Assets$$

### Inventory Intensity

Inventory intensity reflects or estimate of the amount of stock allocated by an entity (Simanjuntak et al., 2024).

$$INVNT = \frac{Total\ Inventory}{Total\ Assets}$$

### Audit Committee

This study uses the total audit committee membership in an entity as a representative of the audit committee.

$$KA = Number\ of\ Audit\ Committee\ Members$$

### Data Analysis Method

This study utilizes panel regression model and Moderated Regression Analysis, conducted with the EViews version 12 software, for data analysis. The specific model equation utilized here involves panel regression presented below:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 Z + \beta_5 (X_1 * Z) + \beta_6 (X_2 * Z) + \beta_7 (X_3 * Z) + e$$

Information:

Y	= Tax Aggressiveness
$\alpha$	= Constant
X1	= Leverage
X2	= Company Size
X3	= Inventory Intensity
$\beta_1 \beta_2 \beta_3$	= Regression Coefficient
Z	= Audit Committee
e	= Error

## RESEARCH RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Descriptive statistical analysis involves data on minimum, maximum, and average values, as well as standard deviations to understand the situation of the enterprise during the study period. elements of this analysis are detailed in the table below.

**Table 2. Descriptive Statistic**

Variable	Mean	Median	Max	Min	Std. Dev
Tax Aggressiveness (ETR)	0.235932	0.219700	0.806900	0.017400	0.089019
Leverage (LEV)	0.425977	0.413900	2.311900	0.018900	0.309159



Company Size (SIZE)	29.16973	29.35450	32.85990	25.55660	1.707233
Inventory Intesity (INVNT)	0.182548	0.151900	0.716400	0.009800	0.127503
Audit Committee (KA)	3.056604	3.000000	5.000000	2.000000	0.360121

Source: *Output EViews 12, 2025*

The descriptive statistics findings indicate that the average of the tax aggressiveness variable amounts to 0.235, indicating that the companies in the sample paid taxes amounting to 23.5% of their earnings before tax. When compared to the corporate tax rate in Indonesia (22%), the companies are relatively not aggressive in avoiding taxes. The average leverage level variable is 0.425 with a high dispersion measure (0.309), signifying that companies finance approximately 42.5% of their assets through debt, and there is wide variability among companies in their capital structure. The minimum leverage value recorded is 0.018, indicating that almost all the company is financed by equity, while the maximum value reaches 2.311, suggesting the presence of companies with debt more than twice their assets, which could reflect high financial risk.

The average firm size value is 29.169, with a relatively small standard deviation (1.7%), indicating that most companies are classified as large. The average inventory intensity equals 0.182, showing that approximately 18.2% of the companies' total assets are in the form of inventory. However, with a high standard deviation (12.7%), this signifies a considerable disparity in inventory management among companies. A lower bound of 0.009 suggests certain firms possess almost no stock, whereas the highest value recorded is 0.716 indicates companies that rely on inventory for more than 70% of their assets, which could indicate high risk in stock management. On average, there are 3 audit committee members, which is the minimum number according to the Financial Services Authority regulations. A spread indicator of 0.36 shows that almost all companies have a uniform number of members, ranging from 3 to 4 people.

### Model Selection Test

**Table 3. Model Selection Test**

Model Specification	Statistic	P-Value	Model
Chow Test	Cross-section Chi-square	0.0001	Fixed Effect Model (FEM)
Hausman Test	Cross-section random	0.0169	Fixed Effect Model (FEM)

Source: *Output EViews 12, 2025*

Choosing the suitable panel regression type involved the application of three standard tests: Chow, Hausman, and Lagrange Multiplier testing methods. These tests aid in identifying the most suitable model namely CEM, FEM, or REM models for the given data and research questions. The Chow test results indicated a Cross-section Chi-square probability of 0.0001 ( $p < 0.05$ ), resulting in choosing the FEM. Similarly, Hausman's test returned a random cross-sectional result probability of 0.0169 ( $p < 0.05$ ), also favoring the Fixed Effect Model. Consequently, the Fixed Effect Model was determined to be the optimal model for this study.

## Classical Assumption Test

### Multicollinearity Test

**Table 4. Multicollinearity Test**

	ETR	LEV	SIZE	INVNT	KA
ETR	1.000000	0.344650	0.042522	-0.029128	0.106179
LEV	0.344650	1.000000	0.201012	-0.067870	0.146372
SIZE	0.042522	0.201012	1.000000	-0.111741	-0.002497
INVNT	-0.029128	-0.067870	-0.111741	1.000000	0.057861
KA	0.106179	0.146372	-0.002497	0.057861	1.000000

Source: Output EViews 12, 2025

Multicollinearity analysis reveals that the interrelation coefficients among the explanatory factors are low, with all values being less than 0.8. This suggests no multicollinearity issue, as a correlation coefficient below 0.8 for each independent variable is the criterion (Ghozali, 2018).

### Heteroscedasticity Test

**Table 5. Heteroscedasticity Test**

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.047900	0.588210	-0.081434	0.9353
LEV	-0.001144	0.035657	-0.032085	0.9745
SIZE	0.002504	0.020047	0.124910	0.9008
INVNT	0.018586	0.047426	0.391890	0.6960
KA	-0.000995	0.011494	-0.086575	0.9312

Source: Output EViews 12, 2025

Findings from the Glejser test for heteroscedasticity showed suggesting that the p-value associated with each independent variable exceeded 0.05, thus indicating no heteroscedasticity problem.

### Regression Analysis

**Table 6. Regression Analysis**

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.329402	0.032316	-1.019299	0.3105
LEV	-0.095934	0.030334	-3.162540	0.0021
SIZE	0.021866	0.011100	1.969893	0.0416
INVNT	0.045362	0.025187	1.800994	0.0747
KA	0.012058	0.012904	-1.011907	0.3140
LEV_KA	-0.049471	0.013187	-3.751516	0.0003
SIZE_KA	-0.062398	0.015328	-4.060903	0.0001
INVNT_KA	-0.194591	0.337653	-0.576304	0.5657

Source: Output EViews 12, 2025



The regression results indicated a statistically significant negative influence of debt level's effect on tax behavior (coefficient: -0.095934, p-value: 0.0021), implying an inverse relationship where increased leverage corresponds to decreased tax aggressiveness. In contrast, company size had a statistically strong affirmative influence on aggressive tax conduct (coefficient: 0.021866, p-value: 0.0416), suggesting that larger companies are more inclined towards aggressive tax practices. Inventory intensity, however, did not show a statistically substantial influence on tax aggressiveness (coefficient: 0.045362, p-value: 0.0747), possibly due to variations in how companies manage their inventory or the overriding influence of other factors. The interaction terms revealed that the audit committee significantly strengthened the negative impact of both leverage (LEV\_KA coefficient: -0.049471, p-value 0.0003) and company size (SIZE\_KA coefficient: -0.062398, p-value: 0.0001) on tax aggressiveness. Conversely, the audit committee did not significantly moderate the link between inventory intensity and tax aggressiveness (INVNT\_KA coefficient: 0.045362, p-value: 0.0747).

### F-Test

**Table 7. F-Test**

F-Statistic	2.047295
Prob(F-Statistic)	0.000878

Source: Output EViews 12, 2025

The F-test results show an F-statistic of 2.047, which is significant accompanied by a significance value of 0.0008 ( $p < 0.05$ ). These results indicate that these factors leverage, company size, inventory intensity including the oversight board collectively have an impact on the tax aggressiveness variable.

### Coefficient Of Determination Test ( $R^2$ )

**Table 8.  $R^2$  Test**

R-Squared	0.522266
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Source: Output EViews 12, 2025

The  $R^2$  examination findings show an R-Squared score of 0.522, suggesting 52.2% of the variation in tax aggressiveness is explained by leverage, firm size, and inventory intensity, with the remainder explained by other factors beyond the scope of this study.

## DISCUSSION

### The Effect of Leverage on Tax Aggressiveness

Referring to the regression analysis results, H1 is rejected because leverage has a significant negative impact on tax aggressiveness. This implies that the greater a company's leverage, the lower its level of tax aggressiveness will be. The outcomes of this research are not consistent with the findings of (Amalia, 2021; Suhendar et al., 2024) which suggest that leverage has a positive impact concerning tax assertiveness. However, they align with research by (Anggraeni et al., 2023; Dewi, 2020; Herlinda & Rahmawati, 2021; Hidayati et al., 2021), indicating that companies with substantial debt tend to be cautious in formulating their tax strategies, most likely due to monitoring pressure from

creditors. According to the agency theory, high leverage increases scrutiny from external parties such as creditors and shareholders, thereby limiting the scope for managers to engage in opportunistic actions, including tax aggressiveness. Consequently, companies prioritize financial stability and compliance, which ultimately reduces the propensity to engage in aggressive tax practices.

### **The Effect of Company Size on Tax Aggressiveness**

Based on the regression results, company size strongly affects aggressive tax behavior; therefore, H2 is accepted. This finding indicates that greater company size corresponds to increased tax assertiveness. This finding is supported by studies (Allo et al., 2021; Cahyaningtyas et al., 2024; Darma, 2020; Herlinda & Rahmawati, 2021; Romdhon et al., 2018) which explain that large companies have better access to information and resources, as well as a strong motivation to reduce tax burdens to increase profitability and shareholder value. In line with agency theory, large-scale companies have a stronger propensity for tax behavior aggressiveness due to the pressure to maximize profits and shareholder value. Management utilizes resources and access to information to optimize tax strategies, while the ability to manage legal and reputational risks reduces concerns about negative impacts.

### **The Effect of Inventory Intensity on Tax Aggressiveness**

Based on regression analysis revealed inventory intensity had no tax impact on tax aggressiveness, leading to the rejection of H3. This contradicts research by (Hulu & Hanah, 2024; Nadhifah, 2023; Saputra et al., 2023) that describes a positive impact of inventory intensity on tax aggressiveness. However, this research's findings remain consistent with findings by (Rista et al., 2022; Setiawati, 2024; Susanti & Satyawan, 2020) suggesting inventory intensity does not influence tax aggressiveness behavior. Although theoretically, companies with high inventory intensity have the potential to engage in aggressive tax management, these results indicate that this influence is not strong enough, possibly due to variations in inventory management among companies or the influence of other more dominant factors.

### **The Effect of the Audit Committee on Moderating the Relationship Between Leverage and Tax Aggressiveness**

The study outcomes show that the audit committee strengthens the effect of leverage on tax aggressiveness, thus H4 is accepted. This observation is relevant to research by (Marsina et al., 2024; Raflis & Ananda, 2020) which states that the presence of an audit committee makes leverage more effective in reducing corporate tax aggressiveness. The audit committee functions optimally as an internal control mechanism capable of limiting opportunistic behavior of management in tax planning. This finding is consistent with agency theory, where a strong oversight structure can mitigate actions by managers that potentially harm shareholders.

### **The Effect of the Audit Committee on Moderating the Relationship Between Company Size and Tax Aggressiveness**

The outcomes derived from the regression analysis indicate that the audit committee

strengthens the positive impact of company size toward tax aggressiveness behavior by mitigating the tendency of large firms to pursue assertive tax schemes practices, thus supporting H5. Results of this investigation align with discoveries of (Novia et al., 2024), which suggest that although large companies are more inclined toward assertive taxation because of greater resources, the presence of an audit committee can reduce this influence through effective oversight. This aligns with agency theory, which posits that effective monitoring, such as by an audit committee, can minimize conflicts of interest and practices detrimental to shareholders. The presence of an audit committee fulfilling its obligations in overseeing auditors and management functions crucially in minimizing tax aggressiveness practices.

### **The Effect of the Audit Committee on Moderating the Relationship Between Inventory Intensity and Tax Aggressiveness**

Based on the regression results, the direction of the moderation relationship is negative. The audit committee was unable to significantly moderate the impact of inventory intensity on aggressive tax behavior; therefore, hypothesis 6 was rejected. This research is relevant to the study by (Wulandari et al., 2024) where the audit committee was also incapable of influencing the impact of inventory intensity on tax aggressiveness. In other words, the existence of the audit committee is not strong enough to control or limit aggressive tax practices related to inventory management. This result indicates that the performance quality of the audit board in overseeing inventory-related aspects has not been optimal, or there are other more significant aspects that could impact on this relationship.

### **CONCLUSION**

This research was conducted to examine the impact of leverage, company size and inventory intensity on tax aggressiveness and to present the audit committee in moderating the relationship of these variables in non-cyclical consumer firms on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2021 and 2023. Referring to the regression results, it was found that leverage exerts a strong negative impact on tax aggressiveness, implying a higher debt corresponding to a lower tax aggressiveness. This suggests that stronger oversight from creditors and shareholders can ultimately reduce the firm's inclination to engage in tax aggressive practices. Conversely, company size correlates positively with tax aggressiveness. Large companies generally possess greater resources and access to information, thus being more capable of implementing aggressive tax strategies to optimize profits and increase shareholder value. Meanwhile, inventory intensity has no impact on tax aggressiveness, possibly due to variations in inventory management among companies or the influence of other more dominant factors.

MRA findings show audit oversight affects leverage's influence and company size in relation to tax aggressiveness. The presence of an audit committee enhances oversight and transparency, which enables it to minimize tax aggressive practices, especially in companies with high leverage and large size. However, the audit committee fails to influence inventory intensity effects on tax aggressiveness. The effectiveness of the audit committee in overseeing inventory intensity aspects has not been optimal, or other factors influence this relationship.

A limitation of this study is that the measurement of the audit committee variable solely accounts for the count of members, without considering quality aspects such as independence, meeting frequency, financial background, and member attendance rates at meetings, which can affect the effectiveness of oversight of tax practices. Additionally, the research scope is limited to the non-cyclical consumer sector and a limited observation period. Suggestions for future research include not only measuring the audit committee based on the number of members but also considering other quality dimensions. Furthermore, adding other variables that potentially impact tax aggressiveness, such as ownership structure, profitability, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), or board of directors' characteristics, as well as expanding the scope of company sectors and extending the observation period, could provide a more in-depth understanding of the impact of individual factors on tax behavior.

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